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EV I EW S

D IVINATION AND H UMAN N ATURE : A C OGNITIVE H ISTORY OF
I NTUITION IN C LASSICAL A NTIQUITY . Peter T. Struck Princeton;
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016. x, 288 p. ISBN 9780691169392.
$45.00.

O

NE OF THE ADVANTAGES OF THE INTERNET

is that readers might be able to
witness, even after the fact, the development of an author’s ideas over time.
In this case, Peter Struck has been thinking about this subject for years. In 2013,
Struck delivered the Arthur O. Lovejoy Lecture on this subject; two years later
he shared the basic ideas in a TED talk applying the ancient ideas to modern
notions of intuition. For this reviewer, these earlier results of Struck’s research
and thinking on the topic aided immensely in approaching this book.
The book is a study of intuition as ancient philosophical schools
conceived of it. The question Struck and the philosophers ask is how a person
can know something outside discursive reasoning. The “hunch” or “gut feeling”
or other ways of reading the signs intuitively that lead to some kind of
knowledge is a vitally important query especially to those who have delved into
epistemology and rhetoric. Such “divination” is as much a part of the ancient
world and as mundane as wine and olives. Interestingly, even those considered
by subsequent ages as the apex of human reason treat this type of divination
and intuition seriously rather than reject it as superstition and the like. Even
Plato’s Socrates after all cites the oracular pronouncements of the Delphic
priestess.
In part, Struck’s book continues in a tradition begun by E.R. Dodd
almost seventy years ago with the lectures that became his book The Greeks and
the Irrational. Struck, however, points out that the resultant dichotomy of Greek
reason vs. unreason (or irrational) is something of a false dichotomy since from
our point of view the “rational” is imbued with this divination and practicing
various types of divination must perforce use reason. The author then sets his
limits: he is not interested in the magician and especially not in the various
diviners in the agora or itinerant travelers claiming to read the signs and that
type are often criticized, even in the ancient world, practitioner of the craft of
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divination. Rather he is interested in other types of intuitive knowledge,
specifically how the philosophers thought about intuition as a way to
knowledge.
Struck strikes out in a different direction than his academic
predecessors on this subject. Previous studies on divination have examined its
role in the political sphere, and how it is a political tool often used to convince
others of a course of action. The other, and seemingly opposite, approach is to
examine divination as a part of magical practices and the occult. This book by
contrast wants to examine philosophical literature on the topic, a hitherto
seldom consulted set of sources on divination’s relation to reason.
This is laid out in Struck’s important introduction. What follows is four
chapters, each considering an ancient philosopher. The second chapter and first
thinker under consideration is Plato. Struck focuses on the verb manteuomai
which is usually defined as “presage, surmise by presentiment,” but also refers
to consultation of oracles. Struck examines Plato’s works showing that this
philosopher uses the term to refer to what we call intuition, a kind of knowing
without reasoning. This “knowing in a flash” as Struck describes it would
therefore not include the “technical” types of divination such as reading entrails,
portents, and signs. Plato in the Phaedrus, for example, talks about the typology
of madness; in the discussion at Phaedrus 249 the discussion has turned to the
philosopher who is inspired and so has a kind of knowledge not arrived at
through reasoning whom, because they do not know the philosopher is
inspired, the crowd considers to be mad. As an aside, one can only think of the
“antics” of Diogenes of Sinope no longer as antics but as inspired actions
(sleeping in a ceramic jar in the agora, carrying a lit lamp in broad daylight
looking for an honest man and the like) that his contemporaries at best
considered mad.
The Timaeus is singled out for particular attention. Here Plato discusses
the “upper” and “lower” parts of the soul. The upper soul resides in the head
and involves reason; the lower soul resides in the liver and involves appetite.
The lower soul may have knowledge but only when the upper soul sleeps. Then
the lower soul is able to sense or divine (manteuoomai) knowledge. From there
Struck examines the dialogue’s discussion of non-discursive knowledge arrived
at in sickness, in dreams, or in possession by a daimon. Divinatory dreams are
images that are reflected on the surface of the liver; the whole purpose and
placement of the liver in the body is to be receptive to divination as stated in
Timaeus 71e.
This discussion of the Timaeus and dreams easily moves into the next
chapter that chiefly considers Aristotle’s treatise Divination in Sleep (Περὶ τῆς
καθ᾽ ὕπνον μαντικῆς; De Divinatio per Somnun in Latin). This is the longest
chapter in the book covering some eighty pages. Aristotle, as is well known, is a
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more systematic thinker than Plato and seeks to explain the causes of divination
in the sense of knowing and prescience arrived at non-discursively. Struck
argues that Aristotle is not attempting to debunk dreams and divination in this
treatise. Rather, the thinker is considering whether such dreams have a natural
or a daimonic cause; it is the daimonic mode through which the divine works in
the world. Like Plato, the experience of these dreams occurs in the lower soul,
the nutritive soul in Aristotle’s terms. Aristotle concludes that these two types
of knowing, discursive reason and intuition, are mutually exclusive. In order to
receive the latter, one must be “empty-headed,” which certainly relates to Plato’s
discussion of the upper soul needing to be asleep.
Much of Struck’s analysis in this chapter is concerned with mapping
out how divination as a way of knowing fits into Aristotle’s cosmic teleology
and the discussion of causes. In the latter part of this discussion, Struck turns to
another of Aristotle’s works, Eudemian Ethics, and the discussion there on why
certain people have consistent good fortune. Nature is daimonic. Luck, intuition,
and the like are natural impulses manipulated by the divine through causal
changes in the natural world. When, for example, a dream does not align with
actual events, Artistotle believes that this is because somewhere in the causal
chain something interrupted the chain of cause and effect or a different effect
was something not originally foreseen. So, the dream was a possible outcome
rather than a determined outcome. Aristotle sees consistent good fortune and
this type of intuition/divination (divinely inspired intuition) as a natural
process, but a natural process affected by the divine.
The next chapter deals with Posidonius and the Stoics. In this chapter
there is a necessary shift in semantics in discussing divination. The Stoics
understood divination and discussed it with reference to what Plato and
Aristotle differentiated: the “technical” interpretation of signs, portents, and the
like as well as the dreams, notions, hunches and so on. For the Stoics, these seem
to be the same category. The focus of this chapter is Cicero’s De Divinatione, in
particular book 1.118-32 that contains an examination of the arguments
attributed there to Posidonius of Rhodes, whose works sadly come to us only in
fragments and quotations by other authors.
The Stoic universe is permeated with the divine pneuma, breath or
spirit. In this model then, everything is in some way touched by the divine;
further, each and every “thing” in the universe may affect another. This latter
phenomenon is call sympatheia, “co-feeling.” Inklings and Mythlore readers will
recognize this notion in Charles Williams’s novels. The pneuma constitutes the
“world-soul” and contains not only the present but also the causes of future
events and modes of being. Cause and effect occur in mostly predictable
patterns. These patterns are discernible and readable by the technical diviners.
But the individual soul also may know these patterns when it is free from the
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demands of daily life and is able then to have direct concourse with the pneuma.
This latter is what in the previous chapters has been referred to as divination
and intuition. But for the Stoics the technical diviner, reader of signs, portents,
entrails, and the like, is just as valid a perception of the pneuma and the chain of
causes and their effects as divining intuition.
Like the previous philosophers, the Stoics posit that the waking soul is
incapable of such communion with the world-soul. Sleep is the state during
which this state of union may occur. The Stoics as is well known posit a holistic
cosmos, almost a living being in itself. Divination then in this view is simply
perceiving the larger picture rather than the smaller conditions of each
individual part.
Between the Stoics and the Neoplatonists a great deal happened in
intellectual history. The Neoplatonists, rising in the third century CE, reacted
rather negatively to two groups that were reading Plato carefully, Gnostics and
Christians. While all three share some fundamental ideas, they nonetheless
reacted against one another. In particular both Christians and Neoplatonists
reacted against the Gnostics, particularly the Sethians. At base, the
disagreements here were the nature of the material and its relationship to the
soul seeking the divine.
Regrettably, since the Neoplatonists reject some essential notions that
Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics hold in common, at least some summary of this
transition should have been included in the book. Instead, Struck begins with
Iambilichus without contextualization. Two important factors separate the
Neoplatonist Iambilichus from the others discussed in the book. First,
Neoplatonists reject the physical world as important in reaching the divine,
divination and intuition and knowledge. Second, the Neoplatonists are not in
any way concerned with the narrow results of divination/intuition. That is to
say, in previous thought intuition and divination dealt chiefly with mundane
issues such as whether it was auspicious to engage in a business deal, if that
family was good to marry into, or other day to day affairs. For Iambilichus,
divination is a method by which one discerns the structure of the cosmos. He
rejects the idea that the body must be asleep in order for divination and intuition
of the type discussed may occur. In fact, the rational part must be active rather
than at rest; for Iambilichus it is only through the operation of the reason that
humans ascend to the divine. Further, for this thinker only that ascent may be
called divination. Iambilichus in fact applies a new term to this, epibole, that
Struck translates as intuition.
In the conclusion, Struck strikes a different note by examining the
divination of Penelope in The Odyssey. Penelope wrestles with whether or not
the stranger in her house is her missing husband. Struck argues that the frequent
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signs in Books 19 and 20 and how they are read are non-discursive knowledge
and arise without the interference of the rational mind.
This is a fascinating book and an important contribution to the history
of intuition in the ancient world, since Struck takes a significantly different set
of texts and assumptions than previous studies of divination/intuition. There
are some sections where it seems Struck is stretching definitions to some degree;
decontextualizing subsequent schools of thought such as the Stoics and
Neoplatonists whose understandings of divination and its purposes differed
from Plato and Aristotle also seems to me somewhat problematic, at least for the
non-specialist. Nonetheless, these criticisms are rather minor in comparison to
the majority of the text which does not cease to hold the interest.
—Larry Swain
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T AROT OF THE F UTURE : R AISING S PIRITUAL C ONSCIOUSNESS . Arthur
Rosengarten. Paragon House, 2018. 326 pp. with notes, bibliography, index, and
b/w and color illus. ISBN 9781557789334 (paperback) $24.95; Kindle version
available.
Wisdom, with its sense of continuity, repetition, precedent, and prudence, is the
highest form of the ordinary functioning level of society. The revolution is far
in the past; it is part of tradition now, and without the fifth stage of prophecy
the culture reflected in the Old Testament would have nothing unique about it.
For prophecy is the individualizing of the revolutionary impulse, as wisdom is
the individualizing of the law, and is geared to the future as wisdom is to the
past.
—Northrop Frye, The Great Code 125
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